35 GROPPERA RADIO AG AND OTHERS v. SWITZERLAND JUDGMENT DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE DE MEYER DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE DE MEYER (Translation) I. The licensing power of States in respect of radio and television broadcasting cannot be arbitrary or even discretionary. It can only be justified inasmuch as the exercise of it is necessary in order that over-the-air communications may function in an efficient and orderly manner and, above all, in order that freedom of expression should be secured as fully as possible1. It is only a policing power, under which States may at most take the measures necessary, having regard to the technical characteristics of the type of communication concerned, for satisfying as far as possible the needs and wishes of all interested parties and to enable them as far as possible to broadcast and receive what they wish to broadcast and receive, just as, in the same spirit, States may take measures to regulate the practical arrangements2 for this kind of communication. The power can only affect radio and television broadcasting as means of communication and not the communication by these means itself - it cannot include a right to interfere with what is communicated, the content of the communication. States' licensing power does not, as such, imply a power to deny certain individuals or categories of individual the right to avail themselves of freedom of expression by means of the media in question or to prohibit certain things or certain categories of things from being broadcast, transmitted or, above all, received in that way. Complete or partial exclusions of this kind are not legitimate if they are not justified other than by the licensing power itself. They are not legitimate unless they are restrictions which answer a pressing social need, which are proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and which are justified on grounds that are not merely reasonable but These principles have been clearly laid down by the United States Supreme Court: see Red Lion Broadcasting Co v. the Federal Communications Commission and US v. Radio Television News Directors Association (1969), 395 US 367, 23 LEd 2d 371, 89 SCt 1794; Columbia Broadcasting System v. Democratic National Committee (1973), 412 US 94, 36 LEd 2d 772, 93 SCt 2080; Federal Communications Commission v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting (1978), 436 US 775, 56 LEd 2d 697, 98 SCt 2896; Columbia Broadcasting System, American Broadcasting Companies & National Broadcasting Company v. Federal Communications Commission & al. (1981), 453 US 367, 69 LEd 2d 706, 101 SCt 2813; Federal Communications Commission v. League of Women Voters of California & al. (1984), 468 US 364, 82 LEd 2d 278, 104 SCt 3106; and City of Los Angeles & Department of Water and Power v. Preferred Communications (1986), 476 US 488, 90 LEd 2d 480, 106 SCt 2034. 2 See on this point the case-law of the United States Supreme Court on "time, place and manner regulation" and, in particular, mutatis mutandis, Virginia State Board of Pharmacy & al. v. Virginia Citizens Consumers Council & al. (1976), 425 US 748, 48 LEd 2d 346, 96 SCt 1817, and Cox v. New Hampshire (1941), 312 US 569, 85 LEd 2d 1049, 61 SCt 762. 1