Regarding Non-Exhaustion of Local Remedies 36. While acknowledging that the condition of non-exhaustion of local remedies does not form part of the conditions of admissibility of cases of human rights violation brought before the Court of Justice of ECOWAS, the Republic of Niger considered such absence as a lacuna which should be filled by the Court. 37. Besides, Counsel for the Defendant further averred that it is the rule of exhaustion of local remedies, which enables one to assert whether a State sufficiently or insufficiently safeguards human rights on its territory. He furthermore averred that the protection of human rights by international mechanisms is only a subsidiary protection which is available only when a State, on the national plane, has failed to fulfil its duty of ensuring the observance of such rights. 38. Furthermore, by relying on Article 4 (g) of the Revised Treaty of ECOWAS, the Defendant maintained that the Court of Justice of ECOWAS must apply Article 56 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, to make up for the silence of the texts governing the operation of the Court, particularly as regards the preliminary exhaustion of local remedies. 39. Even if it is irrefutable that the protection of human rights by international mechanisms is subsidiary in nature, it is no less true that such subsidiary nature of the protection has undergone, for some time now, a remarkable evolution which translates into a very flexible interpretation of the rule of exhaustion of local remedies. At any rate, this was what the European Court on Human Rights was saying, in its Judgment on the case concerning De Wilde, Versyp v. Belgium, 18 June 1971, when it found that: "in accordance with the evolution of international practice, States may well renounce the benefits of the rule of exhaustion of local remedies" 40. In refraining from making the rule of preliminary exhaustion of local remedies a condition for admissibility of applications filed before the Court, the Community lawmaker of ECOWAS has undoubtedly responded to this call. The renunciation of such a rule is binding on all the Member States of ECOWAS, and the Republic of Niger cannot claim to be an exception in that regard. 41. Moreover, in affirming in Article 4 (g) of the Revised Treaty that "recognition, promotion and protection of human and peoples' rights in accordance with the provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights", the Community lawmaker simply intended to subsume that instrument in the law applicable before the Court of Justice of ECOWAS. 42. The adherence of the Community to the principles of the Charter signifies that in the absence of ECOWAS legal instruments relating to human rights, the Court ensures the protection of the rights spelt out in the Charter, without necessarily proceeding to do so in the same manner as would the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights. 43. Indeed, from the interpretation of Article 4 (g) of the Revised Treaty, one cannot deduce that the modalities for the protection and promotion of human rights by the Court must be those provided for by the Charter. 44. A distinction must be made between the setting out of the fundamental principles of the Charter (Part I), and the modalities for implementing such rights (Part II). These modalities comprise the creation of the Commission ( Article 30), its composition (Articles 31 to 41), its functioning (Articles 42 to 45) and the procedure to be followed before it (Articles 46 to 59), whereas the Revised Treaty of ECOWAS on its part, has prescribed other mechanisms to the Court of Justice of ECOWAS, for implementing these same fundamental principles. 45. In the final analysis, there are no grounds for considering the absence of preliminary exhaustion of local remedies as a lacuna which must be filled within the practice of the Community Court of Justice, for the Court cannot impose on individuals more onerous conditions and formalities than those provided for by the Community texts without violating the rights of such individuals. 46. In tracing the origins of the entire pleadings filed before the national courts of Niger, the Defendant averred that on 14 February 2006, the Applicant brought a divorce case before the Konni Civil and Traditional Court; that the said court decided in favour of his request; that following the appeal filed, the Judgment was reversed; that the reversed decision made upon appeal was quashed by the Supreme Court; that the decision made after the quashing, with an adjournment, was in favour of the Applicant; that a second appeal was made by the Defendant against the last decision, and that the Supreme Court has not yet brought its proceedings on the matter to a close. 47. The Defendant further averred that on 11 January 2007, a criminal proceeding was initiated against the Applicant; that an appeal was filed against the criminal sentence made against the Applicant and her co-accused, delivered on 2 May 2007; that the Court of Appeal Niamey, after ordering the release from 5