particular cognisance of the fact that under Tanzanian law, assessors are permitted to seek clarifications from accused persons. It thus behoves the Applicant to prove that, in a particular case, the assessors went beyond merely seeking clarifications, which was not shown to be the case in the instant matter. Consequently, the Court dismisses the Applicant’s claim that the Respondent State violated her right to be presumed innocent and be tried by an impartial tribunal protected by Article 7(1)(b) of the Charter. iii. The Applicant was sentenced based on insufficient, unreliable and circumstantial evidence 108. The Applicant argues that the prosecution witness’ testimony was inconsistent and lacked credibility, that the trial court used circumstantial evidence to convict her; that the requirement of malicious intent was not proven and that the trial judge disregarded the assessors finding that the Applicant was not guilty. * 109. The Respondent State submits that following the Applicant’s appeal, the Court of Appeal examined the alleged inconsistencies of the witness testimonies and the issue of reliance on circumstantial evidence, and upheld the Applicant’s guilty verdict nonetheless. In all, the Respondent State avers that these inconsistencies were too trivial to cast doubt on the guilt of the Applicant. In addition, the Respondent State submits that the opinion of the assessors is not binding on the trial judge pursuant to Section 298(2) of its Criminal Procedure Act. *** 110. The Court underscores that Article 7 of the Charter can be read in the light of Article 14 of the ICCPR, which deals with fair trial rights in great detail.34 It follows, from a combined reading of these provisions that the right to a fair 34 See Armand Guehi v. Tanzania (merits and reparations), § 73. See also Wilfred Onyango Nganyi and Others v. Tanzania (merits), §§ 33-36. The Respondent State became a Party to the ICCPR on 11 July 1976. 32