that there is nothing to suggest that any delay was attributable to her conduct. * 93. The Respondent State submits that the Applicant was tried within a reasonable time hence there was no violation of Article 7(1) (d) of the Charter. The Respondent State further submits that the Applicant was first arraigned before the District Court for committal proceedings as her offence is only triable by the High Court. Further, the Respondent State avers that the whole process of committal proceedings takes time. Citing the Court’s decision in Onyango Nganyi and others v. Tanzania case, the Respondent State submits that the Court has held that the determination of unreasonable delay must be done on a case-by-case basis. According to the Respondent State, the Court should consider that owing to the seriousness and complexity of the offence and proceedings involved, the time spent between the arrest and conviction of the Applicant was reasonable within the meaning of Article 7(1)(d) of the Charter. *** 94. The Court recalls that Article 7(1)(d) of the Charter stipulates that “[e]very individual shall have the right to have [their] cause heard. This comprises…the right to be tried within a reasonable time by an impartial court or tribunal.” 95. The Court further recalls that in Wilfred Onyango and another v. Tanzania it held that in determining whether or not the duration of a trial is reasonable, each case must be treated on its own merits and that three (3) criteria should be determinative, namely, the complexity of the case, the behaviour of the Applicant, and the behaviour of the national judicial authorities.32 32 Wilfred Onyango Nganyi and others v. Tanzania (merits), §§135-136. 28