should be carried out by competent authorities pursuant to a warrant, which should contain, 'reasonable grounds to suspect that a person has committed an offence or is about to commit an arrestable offence';57 (ii) Article 50(1) of the NSA 2010 which permits the NSS to detain an individual for four and a half months without judicial review to determine the legality of their detention,58 as opposed to also, the Luanda Guidelines, which require that all individuals in pre-trial detentions should, "either personally or through their representative, take proceedings before a judicial authority, without delay, in order to have the legality of their detention reviewed" 59 ; (iii) Article 51 (2) of the NSA 2010, which gives the NSS unfettered powers to take the decision whether or not a detainee should have access to his/her lawyer, without judicial oversight, as a result of which the Complainant could not access his lawyer until a year after his detention, and was therefore unable to challenge his arbitrary detention and deprivation of procedural safeguards; and (iv) Article 52(3) of the NSA 2010 which prohibits civil or criminal procedures being brought against a member or associate of the NSS unless upon the approval of the Director of NSS, for which reason NSS officials enjoy broad powers of immunity and cannot be prosecuted for any wrongdoing domestically, unless the immunity has been lifted at the sole discretion of the Director of NSS. This power of the Director of NSS to lift the blanket immunities from prosecution had earlier been found by the African Commission in another Communication60 to be "purely discretionary", and thus not a remedy that a Complainant is required to pursue in exhausting local remedies. 80. In relation to exhausting domestic remedies as concerning Articles 5, ?and 9 of the African Charter, in addition to the inhibitions to legal redress for the acts of the NSS officials created by the blanket immunity as discussed immediately above, the African Commission takes note of the submissions of the Complainant that the Victim was unable to pursue legal action in Sudan after release from detention due to a genuine risk of further human rights violations. The African Commission understands that the Victim fled Sudan in 2012 out of genuine fear of further violation on his human rights and has not been back there since then. 81. The Respondent State has not disputed the allegation by the Complainant that the Victim was tortured, nor has it responded to the Communication at all. The issue for determination by the African Commission then is whether the Victim's appreh~nsion of fear for his life, would qualify _as ~n exceptio_n to Artic~ 6.JR)·::°f the African Charter for purposes of alleged v1olat1ons of Articles 5, ,?~.a~c(f~,Jn.Ef· ...., \ African Charter, based on the constructive exhaustion of local remedl13s ru1 ,~ s7 Guideline 3(a). 58 Article 50 (1) (e), (ij, (g), (h), NSA 2010. 59 Guideline 35, Luanda Guidelines. 60 Communication 379/09, fn 19 above. 17 ~