32 O’HALLORAN AND FRANCIS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT – DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE PAVLOVSCHI legitimate public concern which might justify encroaching on the absolute nature of Article 6 rights: terrorism, banditry, murder, organised crime and other truly dangerous forms of criminal behaviour? If the public interest in catching minor offenders (persons committing speeding or parking offences) is so great as to justify limitations on the privilege against self-incrimination, what would be the position when the issue concerned serious offences? Is the public interest in catching those who commit crimes which cost people’s lives less great than in catching those who slightly exceed the speed limit? In my view it is illogical for persons who have committed minor offences to find themselves in a less favourable situation than those who have committed acts which are truly dangerous to society. I am very much afraid that if one begins seeking to justify departures from the basic principles of modern criminal procedure and the very essence of the notion of a fair trial for reasons of policy, and if the Court starts accepting such reasons, we will face a real threat to the European public order as protected by the Convention. I understand the reasoning behind the departure from the basic principles of a fair trial in the case of speed violations: namely, that such offences represent hundreds of thousands if not millions of cases, and that the State is unable to ensure that in each of this vast number of cases all the procedural guarantees have been complied with. I repeat: I understand this line of reasoning, but I do not accept it. In my opinion, if there are so many breaches of a prohibition, it clearly means that something is wrong with the prohibition. It means that the prohibition does not reflect a pressing social need, given that so many people choose to breach it even under the threat of criminal prosecution. And if this is the case, maybe the time has come to review speed limits and to set limits that would more correctly reflect peoples’ needs. We cannot force people in the twenty-first century to ride bicycles or start jogging instead of enjoying the advantages which our civilisation brings. Equally, it is difficult for me to accept the argument that hundreds of thousands of speeding motorists are wrong and only the government is right. Moreover, the government is free to breach the fundamental rights of hundreds of thousands of its citizens in the field of speed regulations. In my view, the saying “the ends justify the means” is clearly not applicable to the present situation. My understanding is the following. I think that in such situations any Contracting State to the Convention has just two options – either to prosecute offenders in full compliance with the requirements of Article 6 or, if that is not possible owing to the huge number of offences committed by the population, to decriminalise an act which is so widely committed that it can be considered as normal rather than exceptional. In my view, there should be no “third way” in the field of criminal liability.