144. Accordingly, in determining the extent of the violation of this right in this case, the Commission considers of the general issue covered by Article 3, namely, whether the Complainants were treated unfairly (discriminatorily) within the legal system in the Respondent State and whether they were denied the enjoyment accorded by the laws in the State. In doing so, the Commission will analyze the supposedly inaction of the authorities of the Respondent State to ascertain the discriminatory aspect of their behavior, in light of Article 14 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan referenced by the Complainants as also being violated. 145. With respect to the adduced inaction of the Respondent State authorities, the Commission, in perusing the Complainants' submission in this regard, observes that the Respondent State did not prevent Mading and the Military Police from destroying the property of the Complainants despite receiVi.rg_their reports of the threats by Mr. Mading. 146. The Commission notes that Officers of the Respondent St;a,t~{part~s~larly the Police at the Northern Division opened a criminal case against rVratling,;!lihdwere. willing to arrest him and had in fact issued an arrest warrant on him for destroying the property of the Complainants and had ordered _for the eypluation of the Complainants' estate to determine the cost of the things that were{festroyed. Also, the Public Prosecution in Central Equatoria State had written a letter requesting for the withdrawal of the forged criminal cas~.brought against one of the Complainants who was also their lawyer, citing that thegase was a malicious proclamation against his right and aimed at destroying his reputation. . 147. Nonetheless, the Com~ission observes from the '£atis of the case, that the relevant authorities of the Respondent State did not take any further concrete action to protect the Complainants from the ordeals they suffered. While the Military Police of the Respondent State had prevented the arrest and prosecution of Mr. Mading, the Complainants were left unprotected from being harassed, intimidated and rendered homeless by Mr. Mading and the State Military Police. . 148. .'""'~ ,';-"' in The Commission bears mind that it has stated that a violation of the principle of non-discrimination arises if' equal cases are treated in a different manner and that a difference in treatment .does not have a reasonable justification, if there is no proportionality between the aim sought and the means employed.w This lines up with the United Nations Human Rights Committee's decision in Broeks v. the Netherlands, that" the right to equaliti] before the law and equal protection of the law without any discrimination, does not make all differences of treatment discriminatory. A differentiation based on reasonable and objective criteria does not amount to prohibited discrimination within the meaning of Article 26."27 149. It therefore follows that the principle of equality or non-discrimi - ~.}~~~~;~;}" 10 mean that all differential treatments and distinctions are ~rbi . he «'0... \ Jurisprudence of the Commission illustrates that Parties must pr, te t t ~e t ~\ received was discriminatory or selective in order to establish t _~tg: ey,\a't-; n t~ E been treated equally by the law.28 Therefore, while Article 3 1\ teesusimilai f-' I "'~ . '.. 0'\1 '"~ >:"HIC~INl /.Q~ )c.'" 0 '" ,". / Communication, 313/05, Kenneth Good v Republic of Botswana, para 219 ·, ..... ~~""c£1 rr<.., r\"Q . 27 Communication No. 172/1984, S. W. M. Broeks v. tlze Netherlands (Views adopted on 9 Apr! . , UN doc. GAOR, A/ 42/ 40, p. 150, para. 13 28 Communication 323/06 - Egtjptian Initiative for Personal Rights find JNTERRIGHTS v Egtjpt, para 176. 77th Ordinary Session of the ACHPR 26 26 I