81. In relation to the above-mentioned arguments by the Complainants, the Commission finds substantive evidence that supports the Complainants' allegations that they are unable to pursue their case to the apex domestic Courts and that the blockages constitute prima facie evidence to demonstrate the inability of local courts to guarantee the Complainant fair trial processes. 82. The Commission took a similar stance in Zegveld &Amp; Anor v. Eritrea'>. In that communication, the Commission was of the view that the Respondent State's denial of access to the remedies under domestic law to the detainees, had prevented the complainants from exhausting local remedies. 83. In Haregewoin Gabre-Selassie and IHRDA16, the Commission stated that the exception to the rule on the exhaustion of domestic remedies would apply where the domestic situation of the State does not afford due process of law for the protection of the right or rights that have allegedly been violated. In that Communication, the Commission deduced that.r'the victims could .not access the courts to claim protection of their rights, either because they have been displaced, or because they are being harassed, intimidated and persecuted and that the prevalence of violence in the region makes any attempt at exhausting local remedies by the victims an affront to common sense, goodconscience and justice."17 84. The above-mentioned case is similar in the 'present Communication. The Commission opines that the blockages, arrests and denial-of access by institutions and functionaries of the Respondent State prevented, the Complainants from exhausting local remedies and, therefore makes those remedies unavailable, ineffective and insufficien't and thus exempt the Complainants from the obligation to exhaust local judicial remedies. 85. For the above reasons, the Commission finds that this Communication complies with Article 56(5) of the African Charter. 86. Article 56(6) of the African Charter provides that a Communication must be submitted ' ... within a reasonable period from the time local remedies are exhausted or from the date the Commission is seized of the matter'. 87. This requirement has been linked with the principle of the exhaustion of local remedies stipulated in Article 56(5) - the Commission estimates the timeliness of a Communication from the date that the last available local remedy is exhausted by the Complainantlf and thus adopts the six months time line specified Article 46(1(b) of the American Convention on Human Rights, and in Article 35(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Commission, drawing inspiration from the Inter-American and European systems, decided in the case.of Majuru v. Zimbabwe that a period of six months seem to be the "usual standard".