based exclusively on information disseminated through the media. There is also nothing on the record to indicate that the present Application concerns a case which has been settled in accordance with either the principles of the United Nations Charter, the OAU Charter or the provisions of the Charter. 36. With regard to the exhaustion of local remedies, the Court as it has established in its case-law: exhausted reiterates that, "... the remedies which by the Applicants are ordinary judicial remedies’, must be unless it is clear that such remedies are not available, effective and sufficient or that the procedure provided for exhausting them is unduly prolonged.® 37. Having regards to the facts of the case, the Court finds that the Applicant had instituted a case before the Court of First Instance, which dismissed it in a judgment delivered on 4 February 2014. He then appealed against the decision to the Supreme Court, which upheld the decision of the Court of First Instance on 24 November 2014. The Court, therefore, finds that the Applicant has exhausted the available local remedies. 38. With regard to the conditions for filing applications within a reasonable time, the Court notes that Article 56(6) of the Charter does not specify any time ‘limit within which a case must be-brought before it. Rule 40(6) of the Rules of Court, which essentially restates the provisions of Article 56(6) of the Charter, simply requires the Application to "be filed within a reasonable time from the date local remedies were exhausted or from the date set by the Court as being the commencement of the time limit within which it shall be seized with the matter. 4 Mohamed Abubakari v. Tanzania (merits) (2016) 1AfCLR 599 § 64. See also Alex Thomas v. Tanzania (merits) (2015) 1 ACCR 465 § 64 and Wilfred Onyango Nganyi v. Tanzania (merits) op.cit., § 95. > Lohé Issa Konaté v. Burkina Faso (merits) (2014) 1 AfCLR 314, § 77. See also Peter Joseph Chacha v. Tanzania (admissibility) (2014) 1 AfCLR 398, § 40. 11