violation has not yet been committed, but could very soon be. Going by the indications provided to the Court, the electoral process is to open seventy (70) days before the scheduled date for voting (i.e. 11 October 2015), on the fateful day of 1 August 2015. The Court was therefore seised with the case on grounds of urgency. In the present circumstances of the case, if the Court were to wait for the applications of candidature to be possibly rejected before acting, if it had to wait for the exhaustion of the effects of any transgression before stating the law, its jurisdiction in a context of urgency would have no sense, because the electoral rights of the presumed victims for participating in the electoral race would inexorably be breached. 17. At any rate, this position of the Court, regarding the nature of harms it entertains, was clearly stated in its judgment on Hissène Habré v. Republic of Senegal, delivered on 18 November 2010. The Court recalls therein its case law in Case Concerning Hadidjatou Mani Koraou v. Republic of Niger, where it ruled that it has no jurisdiction to examine cases of violation in abstracto, but concrete cases of human rights violation. Therefore, in principle, a human rights violation is found à posteriori, by way of the evidence that the violation in question has lready occurred (§48). The Court has further ruled however that it may occur that in specific circumstances, the risk of a future violation confers on an applicant the status of a victim (§49). Thus, there may be reasonable and convincing indications of the probability of the occurrence of certain actions (§53). Given such specific circumstances, which the Court considers akin to the conditions surrounding the instant case, the Court can perfectly adjudicate on the case. 18. It is therefore wrong for Burkina Faso to claim that the Court cannot make any pronouncement on the case because none of the rights at stake has as yet been violated. 19. As far as the powers of the Court are concerned, it must equally be stated that even if it is out of question that the Court plays the role of a policeman in the elections organised by the Member States, it could legitimately entertain cases where it appears to the Court that the electoral process was vitiated by human rights violations, and the Court does have the remit to adjudicate on human rights violations. 8