53 MARCKX v. BELGIUM JUDGMENT PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE MATSCHER PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE MATSCHER (Translation) I. The scope of article 8 (art. 8), taken alone, and of article 14, taken in conjunction with article 8 (art. 14+8), as regards the establishment of maternal affiliation I entirely agree with the principle underlying the reasoning on which the Court’s judgment is based: the "respect for family life" guaranteed by Article 8 para. 1 (art. 8-1) of the Convention is not limited to a duty on the part of the State to abstain from certain interferences by the public authorities which might constitute an obstacle to the development of what we consider belongs to "family life"; it also implies that the State has an obligation to prescribe in its domestic legal system rules which allow those concerned to lead a normal family life. Indeed, one may consider it as generally accepted that the implementation of many fundamental rights - and notably family rights calls for positive action by the State in the shape of the enactment of the substantive, organisational and procedural rules necessary for this purpose. On the other hand, it must also be stressed that this positive obligation, flowing from Article 8 (art. 8) of the Convention, is limited to what is necessary for the creation and development of family life according to the ideas which contemporary European societies have of this concept. Furthermore, States enjoy a certain power of appreciation as regards the means by which they propose to fulfil this obligation. In no case does Article 8 (art. 8) impose on the Contracting States a duty to adopt a family code comprising rules which go beyond this requirement. It is precisely in the determination of the scope of the duties deriving from Article 8 (art. 8) or, what comes to the same thing, in the assessment of what is necessary for family life within the meaning of the Convention or of what might constitute an obstacle to its creation and development that, to my great regret, I must differ from the reasoning of the majority of the Court; this necessarily leads me to different conclusions in the instant case. 1. Respect for family life under Article 8 (art. 8) of the Convention as a positive obligation binding the Contracting States in the sense we have just given the expression does not require that the legal bond of affiliation should be regulated in any particular manner. In this connection the only obligation which can be derived from Article 8 (art. 8) is that domestic law should prescribe rules which permit establishment of this legal bond under conditions which are reasonable and easily met by those concerned. It follows that those States which, like Belgium, regulate civil status in such a way that the establishment of the maternal affiliation of an "illegitimate" child does not follow merely from the entry of the birth at the