LETELLIER v. FRANCE JUDGMENT 18 recognises - as in Article 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure - the notion of disturbance to public order caused by an offence. However, this ground can be regarded as relevant and sufficient only provided that it is based on facts capable of showing that the accused’s release would actually disturb public order. In addition detention will continue to be legitimate only if public order remains actually threatened; its continuation cannot be used to anticipate a custodial sentence. In this case, these conditions were not satisfied. The indictments divisions assessed the need to continue the deprivation of liberty from a purely abstract point of view, taking into consideration only the gravity of the offence. This was despite the fact that the applicant had stressed in her memorials of 16 January 1986 and of 3 March and 10 April 1987 that the mother and sister of the victim had not submitted any observations when she filed her applications for release, whereas they had energetically contested those filed by Mr Moysan (see paragraphs 14 and 24 in fine above); the French courts did not dispute this. 5. Conclusion 52. The Court therefore arrives at the conclusion that, at least from 23 December 1986 (see paragraph 39 above), the contested detention ceased to be based on relevant and sufficient grounds. The decision of 24 December 1985 to release the accused was taken by the judicial officer in the best position to know the evidence and to assess the circumstances and personality of Mrs Letellier; accordingly the indictments divisions ought in their subsequent judgments to have stated in a more clear and specific, not to say less stereotyped, manner why they considered it necessary to continue the pre-trial detention. 53. There has consequently been a violation of Article 5 § 3 (art. 5-3). II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 4 (art. 5-4) 54. The applicant also alleged a breach of the requirements of Article 5 § 4 (art. 5-4), according to which: "Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful." She claimed that the final decision concerning her application for release of 24 January 1986, namely the Court of Cassation’s dismissal on 15 June 1987 of her appeal against the decision of the indictments division of the Amiens Court of Appeal of 17 March 1987 (see paragraphs 16, 21 and 22 above), was not given "speedily". The Commission agreed. 55. The Government contested this view. They argued that the length of the lapse of time in question was to be explained by the large number of

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