7 which contain provisions related to human rights. Treaties of the first category which arc crafted in such a manner as to give "subjective rights" to individuals could beyond any doubt be considered as human rights instruments; they arc human rights instruments par excellence. Treaties of the first category providing essentially for undertakings by States Parties and no subj ective rights to indi viduals could al so be considered as human rights instruments. For Lreatics of the second category, that is treaties the main purpose of which is not the protection of human rights but whi ch contain provisions relating to human rights, their case is more problematic insofar as the said provisions generally do not grant subjective rights to individuals within the jurisdiction of States Parties. The Co urt possessing «Ia competence de sa competence>> (A rticle 3 (2) of the Protocol), it is for it to dete rm ine which are the treaties re lating to hu man rights fa lling within its materia l j urisd ictio n, taking due considerati on of their <<re levance» for the exami nation of a case (Article 3 ( 1) of the Protocol). I 6. Such a weighty issue as the appli cable law required consideration by the Court especially as the latter had asserted in Paragraphs 122 and 123 of the Judgment, that its jurisdiction extends to the interpretation and application of both the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 1948 Universal Declaration or Human rights. This assertion of the Court raises questions in relation to the first instrument which is a treaty providing for an intemational monitoring body, the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations; the risk of fragmentation of the international jurisprudence should indeed not be overlooked. Such an assertion also raises questions in relation to the