120. This norm of the aforementioned Convention enshrines the principle of non-retroactivity of the conventions, determining the ratione temporis jurisdiction. 121. And the relevant date for the purpose of establishing jurisdiction by reason of time is, in principle, the date of entry into force of the Convention and its Protocols, as regards the respective contracting parties. (See European Court of Human Rights (THDH) in the case SILIH V. SLOVENIA (GC §164) 122. In fact, in the same sense, the Inter-American Court decided in the case GOMES LUND AND OTHERS (“GUERRILLA DO ARAGUAIA”) VS. BRAZIL, JUDGMENT OF NOVEMBER 24, 2010, by establishing that “In order to determine whether or not it entertains jurisdiction to hear a case or one of its aspects, in accordance with Article 62.1 of the American Convention, the Court must take into consideration the date of recognition of jurisdiction by the State, the terms in which this recognition was granted and the principle of non-retroactivity, provided for in article 28 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.” 123. This Court concluded that “the Court would have jurisdiction for the acts subsequent to this recognition”. It also pointed out that, “Based on the foregoing and on the principle of non-retroactive effect, the Court cannot exercise its contentious jurisdiction to apply the Convention and declare a violation of its norms when the alleged facts or the conduct of the State, which could imply its international responsibility, are prior to this recognition of jurisdiction.” (see §16) 124. In the same sense, the European Court (ECHR) concluded in the case KOPECKY V. SLOVAKIA (GC) that competence ratione temporis covers only the period after ratification of the Convention or its Protocols by the Respondent State, by reaffirming that “(…) the Convention imposes no 21