their methodological pedestal, we may yet recover space for the renewed development of discrimination jurisprudence and theory. 134 199. The Commission notes that there are several practical limitations of the comparator test which encumber effective interpretation of the non-discrimination principle a enshrined in Article 2 and 18(3) . There are instance where there is simply no comparator. In cases of sex discrimination in the workplace, this is rife particularly in cases where women allege discrimination for treatment arising from their pregnancy and breastfeeding. Due to difference in the reproductive capacities of men and women, women would be by the reasoning in Equality now, unable to prove discrimination. Another problem arises from intersectionality 135 where women allege multiple discrimination based on more than one protected ground. A woman is her sex, gender, race, age, nationality all at the same time and maybe discriminated against on those grounds as a complex compound and not singularly at different times. To prove discrimination, she would have to find a comparator who exhibits the same personal traits in a manner that atisfies the "similarly situated" requirement like a glove. I The Commission is persuaded by the Complainant's submissions that, inter alia, the Comparator test imposes a male standard to situations where one does not and certainly ought not to exist. This is because there are experiences women face, solely because they are women which are incomparable to men. The male comparator approach does not allow for an effective analysis of equality and nondiscrimination when rights violations arise from female-specific circumstances where it is likely that there is no male-comparator. 200. 201. The Commission is of the view that this Communication presents a unique opportunity to adopt a substantive equality approach to discrimination beca use it is one of those cases in which there is and can be no comparator. This is one such case where it is imprudent if not impossible to identify a co ator because of the intersectionality of her identity. To illustrate this P, ~ (,-< in orde apply the I/ comparator test, the Commission would have to fin[ a y ung an Kenyan Nationality who was trafficked to Namibia for Sexuaii exP. oitatio;I,1.. 134 Goldberg, S.B (2011) " Dicrimination by Comparison" Yale Law https://www.yalelawjou rnal.org/article/ discri mi.nation-by-co mpari on) 135 See CEDA W Recommendation General recommendation o. 28 on the core obligatio~~'lire~ 2 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 52