223. The Court notes that such a “perception” can be influenced by procedural guarantees such as inclusion, participation and transparency during the different stages constituting an electoral body, legal framework, including during the development of its the appointment of its members and personnel, as well as its functioning throughout the electoral process. 224. In the instant case, the Court takes notice of the Applicants’ concerns about the reform process, notably the disputed levels of transparency about the organisation of the reform process and the hasty promulgation of the law which allegedly prevented the opposition parties from challenging the constitutionality of the law. 225. However, the Court also notes the attempt by the Respondent State to ensure the process reforming the composition of the electoral body was inclusive and consensus based. The Court further observes that the impugned law was adopted by parliament which further underlines the democratic credentials of the reform process of the electoral body. And even if the law was later amended by an Order from the Government, instead of Parliament, the Court notes that the objective of that reform was to grant an additional seat to opposition parties, which thereby further strengthened the independence and impartiality of the electoral body. 226. Therefore, Protocol, the Court finds, that the pursuant to Article 3 of the Applicants have failed to ECOWAS demonstrate that Democracy the national consultations on which the reform process was based were of such inappropriate nature to conclude that the resulting electoral body manifestly lacks confidence from relevant political stakeholders in respect of its reform process. 227. In sum, the Court finds that the Applicants have failed to demonstrate that the Respondent State established an electoral body that is composed of members who ruling are not independent and party, overly impartial, institutionally manifestly imbalanced dependent due to in favour of the inadequate degrees of 49