settlement and should, in principle, considering the employer’s failure to react, be followed by an action before the law courts.”9 Therefore local remedies that are essentially non-judicial or discretionary are not the kind envisaged by the rule.10 62. However, the Commission notes that, unlike the Ghanaian Human Rights Commission referred to in Cudjoe v. Ghana, the UHRC has the powers of a Court to issue summons or other orders requiring attendance of any person before it, and if satisfied that there has been an infringement of a human right or freedom, the UHRC is empowered to order the release of a detained or restricted person, payment of compensation or any other legal remedy or redress.11 63. Whereas to date the Commission has not deliberated on whether a quasi-judicial remedy is to be regarded as a remedy for the purposes of the rule under Article 56(5) of the Charter, as is the case of the UHRC which is a human rights commission vested with judicial powers comparable with those of traditional courts, the Commission finds that in the present case where the Victims have exhausted the available legal remedies to the highest level and obtained redress, it would be unreasonable to hold that all available legal remedies were not exhausted because the Victims did not seek to have their case heard by the UHRC. 64. Accordingly, the Commission finds that the Victims exhausted all domestic legal remedies, and as such holds that the requirement of Article 56(5) has been met. 65. Article 56(7) of the African Charter states that Communications relating to human and peoples’ rights shall be considered if they: “do not deal with cases which have been settled by the states involved in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, or the Charter of the Organization of African Unity or the provisions of the present Charter.” In essence, Article 56(7) bars the Commission from entertaining cases that have been settled by another international settlement procedure.12 This provision embodies the principle of res judicata to the extent that it excludes a matter which has been settled by the state involved.13 66. The Commission has, in its jurisprudence, adopted the following definition; “Res judicata is the principle that a final judgement of a competent court/tribunal is conclusive upon the parties in any subsequent litigation involving the same cause of 9 Communication 221/98: Alfred B. Cudjoe v. Ghana (1999) ACHPR para 14. See also Communication 313/05Kenneth Good v Republic of Botswana (2010) ACHPR para 88 10 Henry Onoria, The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the exhaustion of local remedies under the African Charter (2013) 3 African Human Rights Law Journal 19 11 Article 52 and 53, Constitution of the Republic of Uganda 12 Communication 266/03: Kevin Mgwanga Gunme et al v Cameroon (2009) ACHPR para 84 13 Lucyline Nkatha Murungi, Jacqui Gallinetti, The Role of Sub-Regional Courts in the African Human Rights System (2010) 7 International Journal on Human Rights 126 11