an individual ‘‘to complain, in abstraction, of a law, by the simple fact that this law seems to violate the Convention’’. Viewed from this angle, the Court agrees with the European Court that: ‘‘it does not suffice for an individual Applicant to claim that the simple fact of the existence of a law violates the right that he has been enjoying, under the Convention. The law must have been applied against his person’’ (…). Thus, in principle, the violation of human right is examined, a posteriori, with proof that the violation has already taken place. However, this jurisprudence has undergone little toning down, sequel to the evocation of ‘‘some exceptional circumstances’’, which allow the admittance of the fact that, there is a risk of future violation, which confers on an Applicant, the state of a victim of a violation of the Convention (…), which admits that, before the Applicant can claim to be a victim, in such circumstances, ‘‘he must produce convincing and reasonable indices showing the probable realization of a violation that would affect his person’’. This means that the mere suspicion or conjecture does not suffice.” 48. Also in CONGRÈS POUR LA DÉMOCRATIE ET LE PROGRÈS (CDP) & ORS. v. BURKINA FASO (2015) CCJELR 295, the Court had opportunity to consider the non-concrete nature of a claim, it held that: “As regards the allegation by Burkina Faso that the Court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate on the case before it, as a result of the nonconcrete nature of the claims of violation brought by Burkina Faso, the Court has always held that it only makes rulings, in principle, on cases of human rights violation which are concrete, real and proven, and not on violations claimed to be possible, contingent or potential. One may thus 15