this argument by referencing a report from the World Bank, which stated that the judiciary of Ethiopia required "significant strengthening to obtain true independence". In its decision however, the Commission reasoned that "it is not enough for the complainant to cast aspersion on the ability of the domestic remedies of the State due to isolated or past incidences" and that it was not sufficient for a complainant to merely argue that domestic remedies are unlikely to succeed without having tried to pursue them. 93. In Nixon Nyikadzino v Zimbabwe=, the Commission asked itself whether "the allegation that Zimbabwean courts are not independent or impartial and are subject to political pressure warrants the conclusion that victory before such courts is unlikely, and thus makes the remedies ineffective". Even though the complainant had relied on ~~;report d{!~~,Commission taking cognizance of the judiciary's susceptibility to political pressure, the Commission nevertheless maintained that the complainant should have attempted to exhaust the local remedies. Ii ::'}F;;.:, 94. In casu, the Commission maintains its position that a general statement as to the nonindependence of the judiciary does not relieve complainants of their obligation to exhaust local remedies. The submissions of the Complainant as to his attempts to approach several institutions such as the Judicial Service Commission, Office of the Chief Justice, Kenya National Commission on Human Rights anCr('I"awSociety of Kenya are not tenable as none of these institutions award or give judicial remedies within the meaning of Article 56 (5) of the African Charter and the jurisprudence of the Commission'". The Complainant's failure to receive the desired remedy upon approaching the aforementioned institutions does not exempt him from his obligation to exhaustlocal judici~l remedies, and neither does it prove that these remedies would be unavailable 'or ineffective should they have been pursued to their logical conclusion. 95. Regarding the Complainant's reference to the decision of the Supreme Court in Judges & Magistrates Vetting Board & 2 others v Centre for Human Rights & Democracy & 11 others [2014] (Petition No.13A, 14, 15) (2013), the Commission will examine whether this decision renders local remedies unavailable or ineffective. As the Commission notes that the Complainant wasnot a party to this case, and states that the decision of the Supreme Court does not dire'ctJy apply to him, but applies only as the Supreme Court is able to set precedents. In such instances, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights for example has held that complainants will not be expected to exhaust local remedies where it is obvious from the jurisprudence of the highest courts that there is little prospect of success. The Commission is however of the view that this situation is not applicable in casu as the Commission adumbrates hereunder. 96. The Commission understands that the Vetting Board is a body constituted by the Parliament of Kenya through the Vetting of Judges and Magistrates Act (Act No.2 2011) to review, within a certain time period, the suitability of judges and magistrates in~f~:~ the effective date of the Act. The Vetting Board subsequently conducted fr~vieW' and/0~ . ., ",t(, ~ "", J i ~ I 34 Communication 340107- Nixon Nyikadzino (represented by Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum)1 ~imbGilbwe, paras 85,91,97,98 35 As in 31 above, also see Communication 741h Ordinary Session of the ACHPR I~ 221/98 .. Cudjoe v Ghana, (ACHPR 1999) para 13 ,I ~ ~ .. ~, r; \ ~ ~l J t p.u·l.)t\ "'... "'~.s' !<:"> .."'.~ st.o 1V""lUCP.''<""'~ fc-vQ"" ("" OMMEE"'~~ ":> '<