159 in the Appeals Chamber. Thus, the Appeals Chamber is also a judge of fact, although it must take account of its disadvantage in that, unlike the Trial Chamber, it cannot assess the witnesses first hand. Further, the Appeals Chamber is in as good a position as the Trial Chamber to decide on the proper inferences to be drawn from undisputed facts, or from facts which, being disputed, are established by the findings of the Trial Chamber. 30. However, where there is a difference in assessments of facts, the Appeals Chamber will not simply substitute its assessment for that of the Trial Chamber. As it was said by Brierly, "different minds, equally competent, may and often do arrive at different and equally reasonable results"4. Similarly, it has been remarked that "[t]wo reasonable [persons] can perfectly reasonably come to opposite conclusions on the same set of facts without forfeiting their title to be regarded as reasonable ... Not every reasonable exercise of judgment is right, and not every mistaken exercise of judgment is unreasonable"5. In these repects, I agree with the corresponding remark made by the Appeals Chamber in paragraph 64 of the judgement. 31. Consequently, the Appeals Chamber will intervene where it can see that no reasonable person would have taken the view taken by the Trial Chamber. But, of course, the Appeals Chamber can also intervene if the Trial Chamber did not take into account relevant facts, or if it took account of irrelevant ones, or if it applied the wrong legal criterion to the determination of the legal significance of the facts. 32. With respect, I think that, as regards another part of this case (concerning Jaski}i), the decision of the Trial Chamber is not sustained by the criterion of reasonableness. More particularly, however, I consider that, as regards the question whether there was an international armed conflict, the wrong legal criterion was used. B. Whether There is a Crime against Humanity Where the Accused Acted out of Purely Personal Motives 33. Motive is important to punishment. It is always relevant as evidence. In exceptional cases, not including this, it could be an element of the offence charged, as, in some countries, in the case of a prosecution for libel. But, more generally, it is not. 4 Sir Hersch Lauterpacht and C.H.M.Waldock (eds.), The Basis of Obligation in International Law and Other Papers by the Late James Leslie Brierly, 1958, p. 98. 5 In re W. (An Infant), [1971] AC 682, HL, p. 700, per Lord Hailsham.