awareness of the existence of the Court,14 incarceration and being on deathrow.15 42. The Court notes that in the present Application, the Applicant being incarcerated on death row was secluded from the general population. Such a circumstance without any doubt caused him to be cut off from possible information flow and to be restricted in his movements which this Court has held in previous similar instances could cause delays in filing applications.16 The Court notes that these extenuating factors mitigate in his favour. 43. In view of these circumstances, the Court finds that the period of five years that it took the Applicant to file the present Application, was reasonable within the meaning of Article 56(6) of the Charter and Rule 50(2)(f) of the Rules. 44. Concerning the admissibility requirement specified in Article 56(7) of the Charter, the Court notes that the Application does not concern a case which has already been settled by the Parties in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the Constitutive Act of the African Union, or the provisions of the Charter. The Court, thus, finds that the Application complies with Rule 50(2)(g) of the Rules. 45. As a consequence of the foregoing, the Court finds that all the admissibility conditions of Rule 50(2) of the Rules are met and declares the Application admissible. 14 Amir Ramadhani v. United Republic of Tanzania (merits) (11 May 2018) 2 AfCLR 344, § 50; Christopher Jonas v. United Republic of Tanzania (merits) (28 September 2017) 2 AfCLR 101, § 54. 15 Armand Guehi v. United Republic of Tanzania (merits and reparations) (7 December 2018) 2 AfCLR 477, § 56; Werema Wangoko Werema and Others v. United Republic of Tanzania (merits) (7 December 2018) 2 AfCLR 520, § 49; Alfred Agbes Woyome v. Republic of Ghana (merits and reparations) (28 June 2019) 3 AfCLR 235, §§ 83-86. 16 Thomas v. Tanzania (merits), supra, § 73; Jonas v. Tanzania (merits), supra, § 54; Ramadhani v. Tanzania (merits), supra, § 83. 12