CCPR/C/106/D/1912/2009 within its competence to consider the Canadian system in general, but only to examine whether, in the present case, it complied with its obligations under the Covenant. 11 . Author’s comments on the State party’s observations 5.1 On 24 June 2010, the author rejects the State party’s observations stating that they only concentrate on the admissibility of the case. The State party limits itself to stating that the case is without merits without supporting its argument. The author therefore focuses in his comments on the admissibility of the communication. As for the merits of the communication, the author’s original submission has already addressed this aspect. 5.2 The author rejects the State party’s contention that the domestic remedies have not been exhausted. Neither a renewed PRRA application nor a renewed H&C application would protect the author against deportation from Canada. Indeed, the State party’s legislation expressly provides that such application does not entitle the author to a stay of removal pending determination thereof. Moreover, the State party’s position is disingenuous insofar as, in the domestic context, it takes the position that such evidence would not be admissible in the context of a renewed PRRA or H&C application, as it could have been available at the time of previous applications. In the present case, the PRRA officer who determined the author’s second PRRA application refused to consider evidence that related to facts predating the first PRRA. Thus, the medical report in question would not be assessed in a renewed PRRA as it related to old facts. 5.3 In the H&C context, in domestic litigation, the State party takes the position that the doctrine of res judicata applies to all issues that have been previously decided or could have been raised by the author in the course of a previous application and that, as such, evidence that could have been filed in support of a previous application will not be considered. Thus, the author rejects the State party’s argument that he could file this evidence in support of a renewed PRRA or H&C, given that the State party’s position in the domestic context is precisely that such evidence need not be considered in the context of such applications. 5.4 Moreover, the medical report simply confirms that the author bears scars on his chest and abdomen, a fact that was alleged in his refugee claim, PRRA and H&C applications and the veracity of which was never denied by the State party. The situation therefore differs markedly from that in Dawood Khan v. Canada where the evidence in question was a psychological report diagnosing the author with post-traumatic stress disorder, a fact novel to the proceedings. Further, the Amnesty International opinion letter does not present any new facts. It simply reviews the publicly available information on Sri Lanka and offers its opinion on the author’s situation. The non-production of this letter earlier cannot constitute non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. 5.5 As for the State party’s contention that the author failed to exhaust domestic remedies by not applying for judicial review against the negative decision on his first H&C application, the author considers it without merits. The author filed a new H&C application which was rejected. Had he sought judicial review and had judicial review been granted, the Federal Court would have done no more than to order the State party to redetermine the H&C application which has already been done in this case in the context of his refiled H&C application. For all these reasons, the author considers that he has exhausted domestic remedies. Indeed, the only reason why he remains in Canada is because the Committee 11 The State party refers to the jurisprudence of the Committee against Torture in communication No. 15/1994, Tahir Hussain Khan v. Canada, Views adopted on 15 November 1994, para. 12.1. 11