00a22? 34. According to Article 56(6) of the Charter, Applications shall "be filed within a reasonable time from the date local remedies were exhausted or from the date set by the Court as being the commencement of the time limit within which it shall be seized with the matter". 35. The Court notes that, as it held earlier, the internal remedies have been exhausted in the instant case. The starting point for computing the reasonable time provided under Article 56(6) is therefore the date the Judgement was rendered by the Supreme Court, which is 5 June, 2014. 36. The Court recalls that the Application was brought before it on 11 July, 2016. While noting that the period that elapsed between the above date and the date the Court was seized is two (2) years and one (1) month, it lies with this Court to determine whether this period is reasonable within the meaning of Article 56(6) of the Charter. According to its jurisprudence on reasonableness of the time, the Court has adopted a case-by-case approach3. 37. The Court notes that the remedy exercised before ECOWAS Court of Justice is not a remedy to be exhausted within the meaning of Articles 56(5) and 56(6) of the Charter. However, since Article 56(7) has offered him an option, the fact that the Applicant brought the case before ECOWAS Court of Justice, before seizing this Court is a factor that may be taken into consideration in assessing the reasonableness of the period mentioned in Article 56(6)4. 38. ln view of the aforesaid, the Court holds in conclusion that the timeframe of two years and one month used by the Applicant to file the case before it, is reasonable within the meaning of Article 56 (6). lt accordingly dismisses the Respondent State's objection based on belated referral. 3 Zongo, Judgment supra, paras. 121; Application No.005/2013 Judgment of 20 11112015 on the Merits, Alex Thomas v. United Republic of Tanzania, paras.73-74a See Application 003/2015, Judgment of 28109117 on the Merits in Kennedy Owino Onyachi and Charles John Mwanini NjoKa v. Tanzania, para. 65. lt is the opinion of this Court that when the Applicant opts to exercise another remedy such as the review remedy, the period of seizure should begin to count from the date the said remedy was exhausted, that is, the date of dismissal of the application for review 11 "-; 4 @_