lege), that is, no one shall be penalized for an act or omission which was not a punishable conduct at the time of its commission. 117. The second element is the principle of’ “no law, no punishment” (nulla poena sine lege): that is, no one shall be given a penalty for the commission of an act unless such penalty is provided for the act prior to its commission. Together with the principle of “no law, no crime”, this principle prohibits the retroactive application of criminal law. 118. The third element is the principle of individual punishment and the prohibition of collective punishment. 119. The Court observes that implicit in the principle of legality is the requirement that the law must have sufficient clarity in defining a particular crime and specifying the penalty. It is essential to note that clarity is one of the most important qualitative requirements of any law and more specifically, criminal law. It is not sufficient that a law exists, in addition the law must possess a reasonable level of clarity to enable individuals to conform to the boundaries it sets. 120. In the present case, the First Applicant’s claim is based on the fundamental principle of ‘no law, no crime’. The Applicant is not arguing that there was no law in place, but instead asserts that the law which defines the crime he was charged with, namely, armed robbery, is insufficiently defined. This, according to the First Applicant, violates Article 7(2) of the Charter as well as the corresponding provision, Article 13(6)(c), of the Constitution of the Respondent State. 121. The Court notes from the record that the First Applicant and the Second Applicant were jointly charged with the offence of armed robbery in accordance with Sections 285 and 286 of the Respondent State’s Penal Code as amended by Act No 10 of 1989 and 27 of 1991, and sentenced in accordance with the Minimum Sentences Act No. 1 of 1972, which was amended by Section 2 of the Written Laws (Miscellaneous Amendment) Act 31