65. He submits that it emerges from the (new) Article 1 of the law of 2 July 2018 on the HJC that the latter is mostly composed of members of the executive, including the President of the Republic who is the President, the Minister of Justice, the Minister of Economy and Finance and the Minister of Public Service. 66. He further contends that the President of the Republic holds sway in the deliberations of the HJC and that the executive appoints fourteen (14) out of its seventeen (17) members. He further submits that of the nine (9) judges who are members of the HJC, only two are elected by the general assembly of judges, the others being appointed by the executive. He concludes that in view of this composition, which speaks to the control of the executive power over the HJC, the Respondent State violated Article 26 of the Charter. 67. The Respondent State did not submit on this allegation. *** 68. The Court recalls that Article 26 of the Charter provides that “States [...] have the duty to guarantee the independence of the Courts [...]”. 69. The Court notes that this provision does not only enshrine the independence of courts, as judicial bodies, but also that of the judiciary as a whole, similar to that of the executive power and the legislative power.22 70. In this regard, the Court endorses the Commission's position that “[…] the doctrine of separation of powers requires the three (3) pillars of the state to exercise powers independently. The executive branch must be seen to be separate from the judiciary, and parliament. Likewise in order to guarantee Sébastien Germain Marie Aikoué Ajavon v. Republic of Benin, ACtHPR, Application No. 062/2019, Judgment of 4 December 2020, § 310. 22 22