11 DELCOURT v. BELGIUM JUDGMENT Furthermore, the term "bien-fondé", which is found in the French text of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1), refers not only to the accusation being wellfounded in fact but also to its being well-founded in law. Thus, the supervision of validity which the Court of Cassation undertakes may lead it to hold that the lower courts, when examining the facts on which the charge was grounded, have acted in breach either of criminal law or of forms of procedure which are of an essential nature of are laid down on pain of nullity of the decision (see, for example, Section 17 of the Act of 4th August 1832); at least in the first of these cases the prosecution proves to be undoubtedly unfounded. Even the literal interpretation put forward by the Government cannot, therefore, produce the result that proceedings in cassation lie completely outside the scope of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1). Besides, the Court notes that, in fact, the English text of Article 6 (art. 6) does not contain any term equivalent to "bien-fondé"; it uses the much wider expression "determination of ... any criminal charge" (décision sur toute accusation en matière pénale). Thus, a criminal charge is not really "determined" as long as the verdict of acquittal or conviction has not become final. Criminal proceedings form an entity and must, in the ordinary way terminate in an enforceable decision. Proceedings in cassation are one special stage of the criminal proceedings and their consequences may prove decisive for the accused. It would therefore be hard to imagine that proceedings in cassation fall outside the scope of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1). Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) of the Convention does not, it is true, compel the Contracting States to set up courts of appeal or of cassation. Nevertheless, a State which does institute such courts is required to ensure that persons amenable to the law shall enjoy before these courts the fundamental guarantees contained in Article 6 (art. 6) (see, mutatis mutandis, the judgment of 23rd July 1968 on the merits of the case "relating to certain aspects of the laws on the use of languages in education in Belgium", page 33, in fine). There would be a danger that serious consequences might ensue if the opposite view were adopted; the Principal Delegate of the Commission rightly pointed to those consequences and the Court cannot overlook them. In a democratic society within the meaning of the Convention, the right to a fair administration of justice holds such a prominent place that a restrictive interpretation of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) would not correspond to the aim and the purpose of that provision (see, mutatis mutandis, the Wemhoff judgment of 27th June 1968, "As to the Law" paragraph 8). 26. Therefore, Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) is indeed applicable to proceedings in cassation. The way in which it applies must, however, clearly depend on the special features of such proceedings. Thus, in order to determine whether Delcourt has been a victim of a violation of Article 6 (art. 6), it is necessary to examine what are, both in law and in practice, the