It is trite that the fundamental rule of statutory interpretation, to which all other rules are subordinate, is that where the words of a statute are themselves plain and unambiguous, no more is necessary than to construe those words in their natural and ordinary sense. In such a case the intention of the legislature is best declared by the words themselves. 46. In the case of R v Chinthiti and Others [1997] 1 MLR 59, Nyirenda, J. (as he was then) took a similar position when he was asked to determine whether section 294(2) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Code (CP & EC) inhibited the accused’s right to a jury trial and therefore was unconstitutional for offending the accused’s right to equality as guaranteed under section 20 of the Constitution as well as the right to a fair trial as guaranteed under section 42(f) of the Constitution. 47. Ruling against an argument that section 294(2) of the CP & EC had no safeguards and, therefore, there was nothing to stop the Minister from exercising his powers impromptu, discriminately and even maliciously against a certain sector of the community, the Court stated, at page 63, as follows: - In order to determine whether a particular provision of law offends or derogates from another, the question really is whether that is the case on the words of the provision on a literal interpretation or a purposive interpretation thereof. The question is not what the provision would result into if it fell into the wrongs hands. Many legal provisions are capable of abuse, but that does not make them repugnant to the rule of law, justice and human rights… Page 19 of 45