190. In line with established case-law that moral prejudice is presumed in cases of human rights violations, the Court notes that the quantum of damages in this respect is assessed based on equity, taking into account the circumstances of the case.61 191. The Court has established that the Applicant’s right to life, right to dignity and the right to a fair trial protected under Articles 4, 5 and 7(1)(d) of the Charter have been violated. The Applicant is therefore entitled to moral damages as there is a presumption that he has suffered some form of moral prejudice as a result of the said violations.62 192. The Court recalls that the High Court sentenced the Applicant to death on 10 October 2013, a sentence which was subsequently upheld by the Court of Appeal on 30 October 2014. It is evident that the Applicant experienced considerable moral harm and detriment during his time on death row, spanning from the moment of his conviction to the eventual commutation of his death sentence to life imprisonment in May 2020. The uncertainty surrounding the outcome of his appeal, coupled with the looming possibility of execution, has notably added to the psychological distress endured by the Applicant. Moreover, this prejudice has been exacerbated by the extensive delay he faced prior to the initiation of his trial. In the circumstances, it is beyond doubt that the Applicant has suffered considerable trauma. 193. ln view of the above, the Court finds that the Applicant has endured moral and psychological suffering and decides to grant him moral damages in the sum of Tanzanian Shillings Five Hundred Thousand (TZS 500,000). 61 Zongo and Others v. Burkina Faso (reparations), supra, § 55; Umuhoza v. Rwanda (reparations), supra, § 59; Christopher Jonas v. Republic of Tanzania (reparations) (25 September 2020) 4 AfCLR 545, § 23. 62 Cheusi v. Tanzania (judgment), supra, § 151. 49