conviction and sentence. The allegation forms part of the “bundle of rights and guarantees” relating to the right to a fair trial which was the basis of the Applicant’s appeals.12 The domestic judicial authorities had ample opportunity to address this allegation, so that it is unreasonable to require the Applicant to file a new application before the domestic courts seeking redress for this claim.13 50. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Applicant exhausted local remedies as envisaged under Article 56(5) of the Charter and Rule 50(2)(e) of the Rules. B. Objection based on failure to file the Application within a reasonable time 51. The Respondent State submits that, in the event that the Court finds that the Applicant exhausted local remedies, the Application should be dismissed for not being filed within a reasonable time from the date of exhaustion of local remedies. In this regard, the Respondent State states that its Court of Appeal delivered its decision on the 27 October 2014 whereas this Application was filed before this Court on 8 June 2016, which is after a period of one (1) year and seven (7) had lapsed. 52. The Respondent State submits that although Rule 50(2)(e) of the Rules does not quantify a period of reasonable time, developments in international human rights jurisprudence have established a period of six (6) months as reasonable time. It asserts that after the six-month period has elapsed, the “[European/Inter-American] Human Rights Court and Commission do not entertain the communication.” The Respondent State also contends that the instant Applicant does not mention any impediments that prevented them from lodging the Application within six (6) months, which is regarded as a reasonable time, as held in the case of Michael Majuru v. Zimbabwe. 12 13 Thomas v. Tanzania (merits), supra, § 60; Onyachi and Njoka v. Tanzania, supra, § 68. Thomas v. Tanzania, ibid, §§ 60-65. 14