existence of criminal liability for such errors impedes their right to freedom of expression and so cannot be provided by law and that maintaining the provision has not been shown to serve any legitimate purpose. The plaintiffs further contended that limitations in order to be lawful must be shown to be necessary in a democratic society and proportionate to the aim pursued. The defendant in response maintained that the provisions of the sections. under reference satisfy the requirements ofa good law within the contemplation of Article 19(3) of ICCPR. They further submit chat the interpretation of what is harmful or offensive to the reputation of others are culturally and politically relative afd that the stipulations in the provisions being challenged are reflections of the Defendants cultural and political peculiarities and needs and so within the requirements of Article 19(3) and 27(2) of the ICCPR and the African Charter. The defendant further refers to the definition of sedition in Black’s law dictionary and submits that the limitation on the freedom of expression contained in the sections aims at containing advocacy directed at inciting imminent lawless actions within the state. The defendant further contends that the sanctions are liberal and proportionate in so far as they do not impose mandatory custodial sentence but include option of fine Article 19 of UDHR and Article expression and information. 19 of ICCPR make provision for freedom of However, Article 19(3) of ICCPR 34 goes further to