0005r0 it would have been of utmost importancc, for the propef"administration with the Protocol and the Rules, fbr the Court to focus more on the issue of timeframe, as it has always done in its settled jurisprudence. 10. Ilorvcver. of justice and in compliance I l. [n other cases, however, where the timeframes for bringing an application were shorter, the Court had always analyzed the reasons which could have prevented the applicants from being more diligent in respect of the "reasonable time". 12. Indeed, in its settled jurisprudence, the Court has always been very sensitive to the personal circumstances of the applicants (indigence, illiteracy, detention, extraordinary or non-judicial remedies, etc.), and has always shown great flexibility in computing reasonable timeframe.s ll. 'l'he Coufl has alwavs had to rule, and very rightly so, on a case-by-case basis, in order not to be stuck in a very rigid and strict arithmetical consideration.6 ln Warema lfanganko Weremu und Wuisiri Wanganko Waremu o/ 7 December 2018, the Court considered 5 years and 5 months as a reasonable timeframe. It, horvever, justified its gcnerosily in the lollorving words: -The Court furlher notes that the Application was fl le d on 2 Octobcr 20 I 5. that is. after live (5) years and live (5) months from the date of the said declaration. In thc intervening period" the applicants attempted to use the revierv procedure at the Courl of Appeal, but their application lor review was dismissed on l9 March 2015 as having been flled out of time. In this regard, the key issue for determination is whcther the five (5) years and five (5) months'time within rvhich the Applicants could have liled their Application before the Court is reasonable."T 'l he Court lurLher noted that "the Applicants do not invoke any par-ticular reason as to rvhy it took five (5) years and five (5) monLhs to seize this Court alter they had the opportunity to do so, the Respondent having deposited the declaration envisaged under the Protocol, allowing them to directly file cases beforc the Court. Nonetheless, although they rverc not required to pursue it, the Applicants chose to exhaust the abovcmcntioned revierv procedure a1 the Court of Appeal. [t is evident lrom the record that the'five (5) ycars and five (5) months delay in filing the Application was due to the fact that the Applicants rvere awaiting the outcomc of thc [review proceedingsl and at the time they seized this courl, it was only about six (6) months that had elapscd after their rt;quest for review was dismissed for filing out o1'time."8 <-rl'the deposit 14. Whereas this is the first time that it has been scizcd of a case rvithin a timeframe of six years and two months after the exhaustion of local remedies, the Court now pushes its liberalism to the point ol'emptying the "reasonable time" requirement of all its content, thus opening the door to legal insecurity, which the Charter and the Rules seek to prevent. The Court's total silence on such an issue of public order leaves the litigation open-ended. ln allowing a period as long as six years and two months without "l lte European Court ol Human Rights, though bound to respect the six months timeline, also stated: "'l'he r-casorrableness oi the length of proceedings is to be dete rmined in the light of the circumstan ces of the case and with relert:n ce to the cnt eria laid down in the Court's case-law, in particular the complexity of thc case, the conduct of the .rpplicant and of the relevant authorities, and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute." ludgment, Comlngersoll S.A. v. Portugol, Application No. 3532/97, Grand Chamber, 6 April 2000. u lt Zongo & Others v. Burkrnu l.oso, the Court stated: "The reasonableness of timelines for referral of cases to the Court depends on the circumstances of each case and must be determined on a case-by-case basis". I)relinrinary Ob;ections, Application i ludgment, para. 48. ..., 21 June 2013, p.rrn. l2l. I J udgment, para. 49. -f