119. It was obviously clear to the police officers that Munyaradzi Never Chitsenga was not armed and thus did not pose any immediate threat to the safety of the police officers or any other member of the public. Thus a lower level of force would have been sufficient to restrain or apprehend Munyaradzi Never Chitsenga. 120. As explained above, only under closely circumscribed conditions may lethal (or deadly) force be used by the police. Firing a gun at someone is AC HP R regarded as the exercise of lethal force. The overriding logic of the situation remains the fact that the police have the power to use lethal force only as an exception, motivated by a situation of “self-defence or in the defence of others against the imminent threat of death or serious injury”. If that rationale disappears, the foundation for the exceptional powers and consequently the powers as such disappear.20 The sanctity of life requires that lives not be taken in the interest of the common good – for example the shooting of a fleeing suspect in order to promote the general respect for the law. 21The African Commission notes its decision in Amnesty International on behalf of Orton and Vera Chirwa v Malawi,22 where it held that shootings by police officers are a violation of the right to life. 121. The African Commission is of the view that the use of lethal force by police officers of the Respondent State was not within the bounds of the closely circumscribed conditions under which lethal force may be used as described above. The principle is that life should not be taken by the State, and any action that seeks to fall in the narrow confines of exceptions to this rule requires strong motivation. Furthermore, the Respondent fails to prove that the deceased persons were suspected criminals. 20UN Doc. A/66/330, Para 34 21 Id, Para 24 22 Communications 68/92 and 78/92 respectively 33