40. On the issue of exhausting local remedies, the Commission notes that the judgment contested by the Complainants was delivered by the Military Court of the DRC which is a court of last instance, as stipulated in Article 5 of the Decree establishing the afore-mentioned Court. Indeed, the Commission notes that it was first seized of the matter on 10 January 2003, i.e. three days after the sentences were delivered by the Military Court on 7 January 2003. It is undisputed that on this date, the Complainants had no means whatsoever to initiate a domestic judicial remedy as in the current case; the Decree did not contain any provisions for opposition nor an appeal against the judgment delivered by the Court. 41. The Commission notes that on 18 November 2002, i.e. ten (10) months after the conviction of the Complainants, the Respondent State passed a new Law on the military judicial Code providing for appeal and opposition against the judgments of the military court. However, the passage of this law does not redeem the objection to appeal imposed on the Complainants during the entire period of their preventive detention. 42. With regard to the possibility of appeal provided for by the transitional Constitution, the Commission notes that the said Constitution only had force of law on 1st April 2003, three months after this Communication was submitted. This Constitution could not have applied to judgments delivered in March 2002, much less to facts which date back to 2001. Furthermore, as an Appeal Court, the Supreme Court was not an effective remedy as it would only have considered compliance with the rules of procedure and not the substantive issue of the case. Therefore, it was not likely to remedy the alleged violations. 43. The Commission further notes that the Complainants could have pleaded for pardon from the President of the Republic, and in any case, they had filed such a related petition in January 2003. The Commission further notes that on 14 January 2003, in accordance with Rule 111(3) of its Rules of Procedure, it had requested the President of the Democratic Republic of Congo to take all appropriate measures to stay the execution of the death sentences pronounced by the military court. 44. In any case, the Commission adopts its jurisprudential position that the remedies the Complainant is requested to exhaust are mainly of judicial nature.4 The Presidential pardon is not judicial in nature and consequently its exhaustion cannot be insisted upon by the Complainant. 4 Cudjoe v. Ghana Communication 221/98 (2000) AHRLR 127 (ACHPR 1999) para 13. 8