The corpus juris of international human rights law comprises a set of international instruments of varied content and juridical effects (treaties, conventions, resolutions and declarations). Its dynamic evolution has had a positive impact on international law in affirming and building up the latter’s faculty for regulating relations between States and the human beings within their respective jurisdictions. This Court, therefore, must adopt the proper approach to consider this question in the context of the evolution of the fundamental rights of the human person in contemporary international law.(Underlining added). 49. The “interpretations” of conventional provisions include not only those contained in judgments delivered in “contentious cases," but also interpretations made in other orders issued. 62 Therefore, they include interpretations contained in rulings on “provisional measures”; on “monitoring compliance with judgment”; or even on requests for “interpretation of judgment” under the terms of Article 67 of the Pact of San Jose. They should also include interpretations derived from the “advisory opinions” referred to in Article 64 of said Pact, precisely due to the fact that their objective is “the interpretation of this Convention or other treaties concerning the protection of human rights in the American States.” 63 50. In this way, a true "conventionality block” is built up as a parameter for exercising “diffuse conventionality control.” National judges must give consideration to this “block”, which requires them to continuously update the InterAmerican Court’s case-law and promotes a “lively interaction” between the national and inter-American jurisdictions, with the ultimate goal of setting standards for the effective protection of human rights in our region. 51. The domestic judges, therefore, must apply conventional jurisprudence, including the case-law established in matters in which the State to which they belong is not a party, since what defines the development of the Inter-American Court’s jurisprudence is that Court’s interpretation of the inter-American corpus juris in order to create a standard in the region on its applicability and effectiveness. 64 We consider this to be of the utmost importance for the sound understanding of “diffuse conventionality control”, since attempting to limit the obligatory nature of conventional jurisprudence only to cases in which the State has been a "material party" would be equivalent to nullifying the very essence of the American Convention by the national States who assumed its commitments upon signing and ratifying or acceding to it, and whose noncompliance produces international responsibility. 62 Under Article 29 of the Court’s Rules of Procedure, in force since January 1, 2010, which establishes: “Article 31. Resolutions. 1. Judgments and orders completing proceedings shall be rendered exclusively by the Court. 2. All other orders shall be rendered by the Court if it is sitting and by the Presidency if it is not, unless otherwise provided. Decisions of the Presidency that are not merely procedural may be appealed from to the Court. 3. Judgments and orders of the Court may not be contested in any way.” 63 Cf. Advisory Opinion OC-1/82. September 24, 1982. Series A No. 1, related to “Other treaties” subject to the advisory jurisdiction of the Court (Art. 64 American Convention on Human Rights), presented by the government of Peru. 64 Thus, for example, the standards set by the European Court of Human Rights, international treaties, the universal system, the resolutions of the UN Committee on the recommendations of the Commission on Human Rights or reports of special rapporteurs of the OAS or UN, among others, may form part of its jurisprudence, provided that the IACHR's uses and endorses these in making its interpretation of the Inter-American corpus juris and to create the conventional standard interpreted as the Inter-American standard. 18