remedy that an applicant is not required to exhaust.12 However, in cases where an applicant attempted to utilise the review procedure, the Court takes into account the time that the Applicant expended in pursuing such a procedure. 43. In the instant case, the Court notes from the records that the Court of Appeal decided the Applicant’s appeal on 29 April 2010 and he filed his request for extension of time to file his application for review on 7 September 2010. The Applicant’s request was, however, dismissed on 19 September 2013, which was three (3) years later. Given that the decision of the Court of Appeal was pending for three (3) years, it can fairly be presumed that the Applicant was awaiting the outcome of his request and as such, the Court deems it important to consider this fact in computing reasonable time. 44. Accordingly, from the date when the Court of Appeal dismissed his request for extension of time to institute an application for review, that is, 19 September 2013 to the date when the Applicant seized the Court, that is, 22 January 2019, five (5) years, four (4) months and three (3) days elapsed. The question for the Court’s determination, therefore, is whether this delay could be considered as reasonable under the terms of Article 56(6) of the Charter as read together with Rule 50(2)(f) of the Rules. 45. In the present case, the Applicant alleges that: “[d]elay of filing the application was caused by [his] position as a condemned prisoner and layman in matters of law, indigent, incarcerated without assistance of legal counsel.” 46. The Court notes that the Applicant is self-represented before this Court and as a convicted inmate on a death row, is secluded from the general population and cut off from possible information flow, and restricted in his movements. 12 Guehi v. Tanzania, ibid, § 51 ; Wilfred Onyango Onyachi and Another v. United Republic of Tanzania (merits) (2017) 2 AfCLR 65, § 56.