limitations contained in the domestic law of Botswana which is not inconsistent with Article 12.4 of the Charter. 146. These, the Respondent State claims, are those limitations that are necessary in the public interest as well as those contained in Section 11(6) and 36 of the Immigration Act. According to the State, public interest includes the peace and stability of the country and the well being of the people, and national security means the security of the people of Botswana. 147. The State submits that the preclusion of a right of appeal inevitably requires the need to debate the information and grounds upon which the President formed his decision to declare a person a prohibited immigrant, implies that such information and grounds are not to be disclosed. The consequent prohibition of courts from inquiring into the adequacy of those grounds also implies a nondisclosure of those grounds. According to the State, it is not in the public interest to disclose the grounds or information for declaring a person a prohibited immigrant, more so, where the President’s decision is based on national security or is made in the national interest and that his reason for such decisions should neither be open to public disclosure nor subject to scrutiny by courts. 148. In support of its position the Respondent State cites the United Kingdom as an example of a country in the “so–called civilised world” supporting the ouster of jurisdiction of courts on immigration issues. They refer to two decisions of the English Courts to this effect, viz: R (Farrakhan) v Secretary 20 21 of State for Home Department and Secretary of State for Home Department v Rehman , which according to State, support the position that decisions on issues of national security should be entrusted to the Executive and not the judiciary. 149. The State concludes by stating that executive action under Section 7(f) of the Botswana Immigration Act rests in the President who is elected by voters and that the Botswana Parliament has enacted that information and grounds upon which the President has taken a decision are protected from disclosure. Complainant’s response to the Respondent State’s Submissions on the merits 150. The Complainants submit in response to the State’s submission that it is misplaced for the State to focus on bad faith as a criteria for determining a State Party’s compliance with the African Charter. According to the Complainants, what is in issue for determination by the Commission, is whether Botswana has fulfilled its international obligations, not whether it acted in bad faith. th 151. The Complainants state that the Government of Botswana ratified the Charter on 17 July 1986 and by doing so, unreservedly agreed to implement its provisions and since then, it has taken no action to relieve itself of any of its obligations under the Charter either by withdrawal from it or by entering reservations. Quoting the decision of the Commission inInternational Pen (on behalf of Saro22 Wiwa) v Nigeria the Complainants add that any State which did not wish to abide by the provisions of the Charter ought to have refrained from ratifying it. 152. The fact that Botswana as a dualist country is yet to incorporate the Charter into its domestic law, according to the Complainants, may preclude persons within Botswana from relying on it in domestic courts but does not affect their right to recourse to the Commission under the African Charter. A State, whether dualist or monist, according to the Complainants, is bound by the ratification 23 of the Charter even where it revokes the domestic effect of the Charter . 153. Contrary to the Respondent State’s claim that the rule of law is based on fundamental rights and freedoms as set out in its Constitution and that “treaties are sometimes deemed inapplicable if they conflict with Constitutional provisions of the State”, the Complainants assert that principles of international law dictates that the Respondent State cannot invoke the provisions of its domestic law 24 as justification for its failure to perform a treaty obligation . Accordingly, the Complainants aver that what the Commission needs to consider is not whether the Charter is applicable in Botswana, but whether the rights enshrined in the Charter are respected domestically i.e. whether law and practice in Botswana conform to the obligations under the Charter. The responsibility of the Commission is to 25 examine the compatibility of a State law and practice with the Charter . 154. The Complainants argue that limitations to the victim’s right to fair trial, whereby he was prevented from hearing before the expulsion order or appealing the expulsion order, is an inappropriate attempt to circumvent the rule of law and protection of fair trial rights. They submit that