elections directly and primarily impacts the electors living in the territory of that State. 92. The Complainant submits that the Victims are patriotic citizens that retain strong ties to their home country, are keenly invested in its affairs and wish to return to Zimbabwe in the future. This assertion has not been challenged by the Respondent State, and the Commission sees no reason to doubt the position of the Victims. This notwithstanding, it should be noted that laws are enacted to establish general rules and cannot possibly take into consideration the situation of every individual. 30 If this was to be expected, States would then have to enact laws that allow them to test on a case-by-case basis the extent to which each individual non-resident citizen has maintained sufficiently strong links to their home country, which may lead to subjectivity and arbitrariness, also bearing in mind the practical difficulties of implementing such an approach. A similar sentiment was also expressed by the European Court in Shindler v UK, when the court stated that an objective criteria such as residency, instead of a criteria that measures an individual’s ties to their home country serves to “promote legal certainty and to avoid the problems of arbitrariness and inconsistency inherent in weighing interests on a case-by-case basis”.31 93. For these reasons, the Commission is of the view that the goal of limiting the scope of elections to citizens who are primarily affected by the outcome of elections, as determined by residency, is a legitimate aim and may be considered to be in the common interest within the meaning of Article 27 (2) of the African Charter. The restriction must be necessary and proportional 94. The Commission now turns to examining the necessity of the restrictions placed on the voting rights of non-residents, and whether the means adopted by the Respondent State are proportional to the legitimate aim that it seeks to achieve. The African Court summarized this aspect in Mtikila v Tanzania by holding that “the legitimate interest must be proportionate with and absolutely necessary to the advantages which are to be obtained”.32 The principle of necessity also entails that States take the least intrusive or disruptive action to achieve their aims.33 When there are multiple options available to achieve similar aims, States are obligated to take the course of action least restrictive of the enjoyment of the right in question. In Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights & Associated See Sitaropoulos and Giakoumopoulos v Greece (n 27 above) Application no. 19840/09 – Case of Shindler v. the United Kingdom (2013) ACHPR judgment, para 116 32 Mtikila v Tanzania (n 28 above) 33 See Communication 242/2001: Interights, Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa, and Association Mauritanienne Des Droits De L'homme v. Mauritania (2004) ACHPR 30 31 23