referring solely to the applicable law. This approach is restrictive and, in fact, does not correspond, on closer inspection, to the approach which the Court itself has followed through its case-law since 2009. 9. lt was also noted that Article 7 would be a mere repetition of Article 3('1 ) and is, in this respect, superfluous. Professor Maurice Kamto supports this reading in particular when he states that "Articles 3 and 7 are a legal curiosity"a. They would have no equivalent in the statutes of other regional human rights jurisdictions. The "Ouagadougou Protocol should have confined itself to this provision, which makes Article 7 all the more useless as its content is likely to complicate the Court's task"s. 10.|t is not clear whether the drafters of the Protocol intended to exclude certain categories of legal rules, such as custom, general principles of law, etc., from the scope of the Protocol. The use of the phrase "ratified by the States concerned" in both Articles might lead one to believeo that the Court should only take into account conventions ratified by States. lt would be difficult to explain why the next paragraph, 3(2), recognizes the Court's "jurisdiction". lt is well known that for the purpose of establishing the grounds for its jurisdiction, the scope of the applicable law should be opened up. The Court cannot, as will be discussed below, be limited in the reasons for its jurisdiction when it is challenged. ln the latter case there is a clear manifestation of the link between Article 3 and Article 7 of the Protocol. 1 1. This was, in short, the interpretation adopted by the Court on the reading of Rule 39 of its Rules: a Commcntarr on l'n 7 ol'thc l'rotocol,'l'|r ..lf) icun ('lMrtùr on I lnmun und !'t,o1tlt.s' lliyhts nul tlr tt<ttl ^rticlc on the |-)stuhlishrnant o/ the -.lfi'ittut ('tnrt. urlicla-h.r'-urticla.u tne tur.r', cditcd b1'iVl. Karnto.t:d. llrul'lant. 20 I l. pp. 1296 ct scq. " l'roti'ssor Maurice Kantto tcnds torvarrls this apprcciatitrn. Ile statcs that "'l'hc rcstriction ol'thc larv applicablc thc Court to thc Chartcr and thc said lcgal instrumcnts crcatcs an cll'cct ol'irnplicit amputation of thc scopc ol' thc rclcvanl rulcs applicable bl that jurisdiction. It deprives thc Court and thc partics brought bclbrc it ol'thc application or invocation ol'"Âliican practiccs in conlirrnritl rrith inlcrnational standards rclalins to hunran and pcoplcs' rights. custolns gencralll acccptcd as lau'. gcncral principlcs ol'law rccogniscd by Âliican nations. as rvcll as casc law'and doctrinc". rcll'rrcd to in 6l of'thc .,1('lll'll. v- Idcrn. 1197. bl ^rticlc 4