McCANN AND OTHERS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT JOINT DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGES RYSSDAL, BERNHARDT, THÓR VILHJÁLMSSON, GÖLCÜKLÜ, PALM, PEKKANEN, SIR JOHN FREELAND, BAKA AND JAMBREK 64 opening fire once it was clear that the suspect was not desisting; that the intent of the firing would be to immobilise; and that the way to achieve that was to shoot to kill. There was also evidence at the inquest that soldiers would not be accepted for the SAS unless they displayed discretion and thoughtfulness; that they would not go ahead and shoot without thought, nor did they; but they did have to react very fast. In addition, evidence was given that SAS members had in fact been successful in the past in arresting terrorists in the great majority of cases. 24. We are far from persuaded that the Court has any sufficient basis for concluding, in the face of the evidence at the inquest and the extent of experience in dealing with terrorist activities which the relevant training reflects, that some different and preferable form of training should have been given and that the action of the soldiers in this case "lacks the degree of caution in the use of firearms to be expected of law-enforcement personnel in a democratic society". (We also question, in the light of the evidence, the fairness of the reference to "reflex action in this vital respect" - underlining supplied. To be trained to react rapidly and to do so, when the needs of the situation require, is not to take reflex action.) Nor do we accept that the differences between the guide to police officers in the use of firearms (paragraph 137 of the judgment) and the "Firearms - rules of engagement" annexed to the Commissioner’s operational order (paragraph 136), when the latter are taken together (as they should be) with the Rules of Engagement issued to Soldier F by the Ministry of Defence (paragraph 16), can validly be invoked to support a contention that the standard of care enjoined upon the soldiers was inadequate. Those differences are no doubt attributable to the differences in backgrounds and requirements of the recipients to whom they were addressed, account being taken of relevant training previously given to each group (it is to be noted that, according to the evidence of Soldier F at the inquest, many lectures are given to SAS soldiers on the concepts of the rule of law and the use of minimum force). We fail to see how the instructions for the soldiers could themselves be read as showing a lack of proper caution in the use of firearms. Accordingly, we consider the concluding stricture, that there was some failure by the authorities in this regard suggesting a lack of appropriate care in the control and organisation of the arrest operation, to be unjustified. 25. The accusation of a breach by a State of its obligation under Article 2 (art. 2) of the Convention to protect the right to life is of the utmost seriousness. For the reasons given above, the evaluation in paragraphs 203 to 213 of the judgment seems to us to fall well short of substantiating the finding that there has been a breach of the Article (art. 2) in this case. We would ourselves follow the reasoning and conclusion of the Commission in its comprehensive, painstaking and notably realistic report. Like the