direct discrimination. In cases where the discrimination is indirect, the key indicator is not necessarily different treatment based on visible or unlawful criteria but the disparate effect on groups or individuals as a result of specified measures or actions.37 131. The Court underscores that while the Charter is unequivocal in its proscription of discrimination, not all forms of distinction or differentiation can be considered as discriminatory. A distinction or differential treatment becomes discrimination, contrary to Article 2, when it does not have any objective and reasonable justification and, in circumstances where it is not necessary and proportional.38 132. In examining the Applicants’ allegation of discrimination in the present Application, this Court is particularly cognisant of General Recommendation No. 14 of 22 March 1993 on the definition of discrimination of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (hereinafter referred to as “CERD”), which stipulates that: 1. ... A distinction is contrary to the Convention if it has either the purpose or the effect of impairing particular rights and freedoms. This is confirmed by the obligation placed upon States Parties by Article 2, paragraph 1 (c), to nullify any law or practice which has the effect of creating or perpetuating racial discrimination. 2. ... In seeking to determine whether an action has an effect contrary to the Convention, [the Committee] will look to see whether that action has an unjustifiable disparate impact upon a group distinguished by race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin. 133. The Court is further enlightened by the General Recommendation No. 19 of 18 August 1995 on racial segregation and apartheid in which the CERD was of the view, inter alia, that: 37 Kambole v. Tanzania, ibid, § 68. See Tanganyika Law Society and others v. United Republic of Tanzania (merits) (2013) 1 AfCLR 34, § 106 ; Kambole v. Tanzania, ibid, § 72. 38 32