156. The Court underscores that, in their arguments, the representatives did not specifically indicated which information, or documents, testimony or background information protected by article 15 of Law 19,992 would be useful for advancing the investigation of this specific case. The Court observes that, under this law, Mr. García Lucero could have access to the documents, reports, statements and testimony relating to himself and even publicize them or provide them to third parties. Finally, the Court notes that the said provision was not applied in this case to refuse to provide information to any judicial authority and, to date, there is no evidence that in this or any other way it has represented an obstacle that has caused a specific prejudice to the investigations. 157. Based on the above and since the Court cannot analyze article 15 of Law No. 19,992 in the abstract because it was not applied and had no effects in this specific case, and the Court’s contentious jurisdiction must be exercised to decide specific cases in which it is alleged that an act of the State, executed against specific individuals, is contrary to the Convention, 168 the Court does not find it in order to rule on article 15 of Law No. 19,992. C.2.3) Regarding articles 150 A and 150 B of the Criminal Code and 330 of the Code of Military Justice 158. The representatives argued that articles “150 A and 150 B of the Criminal Code are not applicable to the time of the facts, [so that the State] was committing […] a legal ‘error’ because the law was not in force at the time.” In response, the State indicated that the representatives’ argument “is not relevant for the processing of the domestic investigation proceedings.” In addition, it mentioned the enactment of Law No. 20,357, which criminalizes torture in the context of crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes; however, the facts do not reveal that this law is being applied in the investigation opened in this case. Furthermore, following the submission of the respective information requested by the Court, the State indicated that the wording of article 330 of the Code of Military Justice has not been amended since 1970. The State also contested the representatives’ questioning of the said articles and considered that it was not in order to declare any violation on this basis. 159. In this regard, it should be noted that, in its Merits Report, the Commission alluded to the representatives’ arguments that articles 150 A and 150 B of the Chilean Criminal Code and Article 330 of the Military Criminal Code present diverse problems and the fact that they had argued that “these provisions of Chile’s domestic law violate Articles 2 and 8(1) of the American Convention.” However, the Commission did not rule on this matter. Also, even though the representatives indicated, with regard articles 150 A and 150 B of the Criminal Code, the said “basic and serious legal error” mentioned in their brief with final written arguments, they merely stated this, without indicating the norms they understood to be applicable. In addition, they included arguments on precise aspects of these articles and with regard to article 330 of the Code of Military Justice that would make these provisions incompatible with the State’s international commitments. Nevertheless, they did not indicate how, specifically in relation to the facts of this case, the said restriction of the crimes to acts committed against persons deprived of liberty or the failure to punish attempted torture would cause prejudice. 160. Furthermore, the proven facts do not reveal that the 10-year statute of limitations was applied, or prevented or limited in any way the evolution of the investigation of the pertinent facts in relation to this case. Indeed, it can be seen that it did not prevent the 168 Cf. Case of Genie Lacayo vs. Nicaragua. Preliminary objections, supra, para. 50, and Case of Cabrera and Montiel v. Mexico, supra, para. 207. 49