132. The Respondent State argues that the conditions for the exercise of a state’s extraterritorial jurisdiction are not met in respect of the alleged military operations that the Court is prayed to examine, particularly during the active phase of hostilities in an international armed conflict. 133. The Respondent State submits, in conclusion, that the Court lacks territorial jurisdiction in the instant case. * 134. In its Response, the Applicant State submits that the objection should be dismissed, arguing that the Court’s territorial jurisdiction is established if the events took place on the territory of a State Party to the Protocol, to the Charter and to any other relevant human rights instrument applicable before the Court. In its view, the Court has affirmed this approach in several judgments, including Leon Mugesera v. Republic of Rwanda, Ingabire Victoire Umuhoza v. Republic of Rwanda, and Rutabingwa Chrysanthe v. Republic of Rwanda. 135. The Applicant State avers that, in the instant case, the criterion to be considered is not the status of the Respondent State, but rather the status of the State Party to the relevant instruments, which confers jurisdiction on the Court, provided that the events took place on the territory of one of the State Parties to the said instruments. In its view, this is a general principle of international law. 136. The Applicant State submits that the Respondent State deliberately confuses the criterion for determining territorial jurisdiction, which is a matter of form, with that for determining its responsibility for serious, massive and repeated violations of human rights committed on the territory of the Applicant State, which is a matter of substance. The Applicant State contends that, at this stage, it is not seeking to demonstrate the responsibility of the Respondent State. For the Court’s territorial jurisdiction to be established, it must be proven that the acts were committed on the territory of a State Party to the Protocol and the Charter. 33