obligations on State Parties for the consequent enjoyment of the said rights”. 81. The Respondent State avers that while it is true that the Charter of the United Nations and Constitutive Act mention human rights in certain provisions, the mere fact that a treaty mentions such rights is not sufficient for the treaty to be considered a human rights instrument. 82. It asserts that, in any case, the provisions of the instruments referred to by the Applicant relate to the use of force and the maintenance of international peace and security, and cannot, therefore, be considered as human rights instruments within the meaning of Articles 3(1) and 7 of the Protocol. * 83. The Applicant State submits that the objection herein should be dismissed. It argues that the instruments cited by the Respondent State in its submissions are human rights instruments. In its view, the subject matter of these instruments does not necessarily have to deal exclusively with human rights. Rather, they must afford individuals subjective rights, or impose obligations on State Parties, so that individuals are afforded the enjoyment of such rights. It concludes that the objection must be dismissed, since the Respondent State admits “that the Charter of the United Nations and the Constitutive Act mention human rights”. 84. Regarding the Constitutive Act, the Applicant State argues that the said instrument is clearly linked to the Charter, notably through its preamble as well as Articles 3(g) and 4, which refer to a clear and express statement of individual rights. In this regard, it submits that the issue is not whether the rights mentioned in the instrument are specific; it is sufficient that the instruments contain “human rights”, insofar as such rights are never granted to States, but only to individuals who are nationals or “citizens of the world”. 21