sufficient evidence that there is a dispute between the parties in the present case. * 55. In its Response, the Respondent State maintains that the fundamental question regarding the exercise of jurisdiction between the ICJ and the Court, lies in the subject matter of the agreement and not in its mode of expression. It underscores that under Article 3 of the Protocol, the Court’s jurisdiction applies to cases and disputes brought before it. 56. The Respondent State argues that the distinction between human rights protection and dispute settlement is inappropriate, since the Court was established to protect human rights, through its judicial function. 57. The Respondent State further submits that while two international jurisdictions can have overlapping missions, in the instant case, the question is not what the jurisdiction of the Court covers. It asserts that the Protocol does not establish a “principal mission” for the Court, and that in any case, Article 3 of the Protocol includes the term “dispute”. 58. The Respondent State emphasizes that the Applicant State’s argument that the terms “case” and “dispute” are interchangeable runs counter to the fundamental rule of treaty interpretation, which stipulates that a treaty must not be interpreted in such a way as to render certain parts of the text redundant or meaningless. In its view, this principle, known as the principle of effectiveness ut res magis valeat quam pereat, requires that the inclusion of terms in a treaty be interpreted to give them a specific meaning and scope, as applied by the ICJ in its judgment on preliminary objections in the matter of Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation). 59. On this point, the Respondent State argues that in the cases cited by the Applicant State, the Court was not asked to intervene since there was no dispute. Moreover, it avers that the Protocol expressly refers to “cases and 15