review of his detention until the case had been sent for trial (see paragraphs 41, 47 and 75 above). In consequence, and in breach of Article 5 § 4, the first personal contact enjoyed by the applicant with an impartial judicial authority competent to review the lawfulness of his detention appeared to have taken place on 6 February 1997, approximately 19 months after his arrest. 162. The Court recalls that by virtue of Article 5 § 4, an arrested or detained person is entitled to bring proceedings for the review by a court of the procedural and substantive conditions which are essential for the “lawfulness”, in the sense of Article 5 § 1 (see paragraph 139 above), of his or her deprivation of liberty (see the above-mentioned Brogan and Others judgment, p. 34, § 65). Although it is not always necessary that the procedure under Article 5 § 4 be attended by the same guarantees as those required under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention for criminal or civil litigation (see the Megyeri v. Germany judgment of 12 May 1992, Series A no. 237-A, p. 11, § 22), it must have a judicial character and provide guarantees appropriate to the kind of deprivation of liberty in question. In the case of a person whose detention falls within the ambit of Article 5 § 1 (c), a hearing is required (see the above-mentioned Schiesser judgment, p. 13, §§ 30-31, the Sanchez-Reisse v. Switzerland judgment of 21 October 1986, Series A no. 107, p. 19, § 51 and the Kampanis v. Greece judgment of 13 July 1995, Series A no. 318-B, p. 45, § 47). Furthermore, Article 5 § 4 requires that a person detained on remand must be able to take proceedings at reasonable intervals to challenge the lawfulness of his detention (see the Bezicheri v. Italy judgment of 25 October 1989, Series A no. 164, pp. 10-11, §§ 20-21). In view of the assumption under the Convention that such detention is to be of strictly limited duration (see paragraph 154 above), periodic review at short intervals is called for (see the abovementioned Bezicheri case, loc. cit.). 163. The Court recalls that the Shoumen District Court examined Mr Assenov’s application for release in camera, without hearing him in person (see paragraphs 38 and 73 above). Whilst the Court notes that the relevant law has subsequently been amended to provide for an oral hearing in such cases (see paragraph 160 above), it is nonetheless required to restrict its assessment to the facts of the applicant’s case (see the Findlay v. the United Kingdom judgment of 25 February 1997, Reports 1997-…, p. …, § 67). 164. Moreover, the Court notes that under Bulgarian law a person detained on remand is only entitled to apply to have the lawfulness of this detention reviewed by a court on one single occasion (see paragraph 75 above). Thus a second such request on the part of the applicant was rejected on this ground by the Shoumen District Court on 19 September 1995 (see paragraph 41 above). 165. In conclusion, in view in particular of the impossibility for the applicant, during his two years of pre-trial detention, to have the continuing lawfulness of this detention determined by a court on more than one occasion, and the failure of the court to hold an oral hearing on that occasion, the Court finds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention.