274. The Respondent State argues that there were factual motivations and legal reasons pertaining to the detention of the Victim, particularly his continued threat to the security and public order of the State. 275. The Respondent State submits that while states of emergency and the permissible derogations are not mentioned in the African Charter, the Commission under Articles 60 and 61 of the Charter may refer to the rules governing states of emergency under the ICCPR. The Respondent State adds that its Emergency Law does not compromise fundamental human rights standards.85 276. The Commission agrees that the right to liberty as enshrined under Article 6 does not grant complete freedom from arrest or detention, given that deprivation of liberty is one of the legitimate forms of state control over persons within its jurisdiction.86 The Commission however notes that any arrest or detention must be carried out in accordance with the procedure established by domestic law,87 which must meet the requisite international standards in order for it to be considered valid.88 277. Article 3 (1) of the Emergency Law provides that the President of the Republic may, whenever the state of emergency is declared, take the appropriate measures to preserve security and public order, particularly the arrest of suspects or persons endangering security and public order, and administrative detention, without adherence to the regulations set down in the Criminal Procedure Code. 278. The Commission observes that the Law is indeed broad in that it does not indicate which actions can be considered as endangering security and public order, conferring a wide degree of discretion to law enforcement officials. The Commission is aware of the practical difficulty of drafting laws that will cover the wide range of possible human activities. However, in this case, the Commission finds that the contested section does not provide a fair warning. 279. The Commission refers to Rafael Marques de Morais (represented by the Open Society Institute and Interights) v. Angola, in which the UN Human Rights Committee defined arbitrariness in the context of arrest and detention as more than an action that goes against the law. The Committee noted that arbitrariness also includes “elements of inappropriateness, injustice, lack of predictability and due process of law.” The Commission’s Luanda Guidelines also provide that the The Commission notes that since the submission of this Communication, the 2014 Constitution of Egypt has introduced some limitations on the President’s power to declare a state of emergency, including the requirement to specify the period of its application for not more than three (3) months. The Commission also notes that the Emergency Law has been lifted and reinstated by the Respondent State a number of times since the submission of this Communication. However, in line with its previous decisions, the Commission in this Communication holds that it makes its ruling by considering the alleged facts as at the time of submission of the Complaint. See, Constitution of Egypt (2014), Article 154. See also, Law Office of Ghazi Suleiman v Sudan (n 7 above), para 40 and Organisation mondiale contre la torture et al v Rwanda (n 6 above), para 21. 86 Abdel Hadi and others v. Sudan (n 32 above), para 79. Article 27 (2) of the Charter accommodates certain restrictions in the exercise of the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Charter. 87 Communication 241/01 - Purohit v The Gambia (2003) ACHPR, paras 64 - 65. 88 Abdel Hadi and others v. Sudan (n 32 above), para 79. 85 44