M.C. v. BULGARIA JUDGMENT 25 On the way, the accused had talked about his sexual problems and needs. The accused had regarded the fact that the girl had let him discuss these subjects as an acceptance that the situation was developing towards intimate contact. The victim had been afraid that the accused would turn violent if she did not let him talk. At one point, the accused had stopped the car and asked the victim to get into the luggage compartment, where sexual intercourse had taken place. The accused had asked the girl several times whether she agreed or not. The victim stated that she had had a mental block and had been afraid. The city court had convicted the accused, finding that the girl had not consented and that the accused had acted with intent, as he would only have had reason to put questions to the victim if he had doubted that she agreed to sexual intercourse. The court of appeal, however, found that the statement of the accused that he had perceived the victim's passivity as acceptance could not be disregarded and acquitted him. (iii) Ireland 138. The principle that the prosecution must prove lack of consent, and not the presence of force, is well established. Absence of consent is a matter of fact for the jury to decide, having regard to all relevant circumstances and following the judge's directions. As regards the mens rea of rape, a defence of “genuine belief” is open to the accused, so that he is entitled to acquittal if it genuinely did not occur to him that the victim might not be consenting. (iv) The United Kingdom 139. Before 1976 the common-law definition of rape was unlawful sexual intercourse with a woman without her consent, by force, fear or fraud. Historically, injury to the body was required as proof of force and as proof of resistance. 140. Under current law, after 1976, the prosecution must prove that the victim did not consent. Absence of consent is the key element of the actus reus. The burden is on the prosecution. There is no statutory definition of consent or lack of it. “Does not consent” is a question of fact for the jury, which it decides after hearing the judge's directions. In the leading case of Olugboja [1982] Queen's Bench 320, [1981] 3 All England Law Reports 443, two teenage girls had been given a lift home by the accused and his friend. Instead of taking the girls home, the two men took them to another house where the accused person's friend raped one of the girls, who was 16 years old. The accused then also had intercourse with her. He told her to take off her trousers. She did so because she was frightened and the room was dark. She told him “why can't you leave me alone”. He pushed her onto a sofa and had intercourse with her. She did not cry out or struggle. He was convicted of rape. Lord Justice Dunn said: “[The jury] should be directed that consent, or the absence of it, is to be given its ordinary meaning and if need be, by way of example, that there is a difference