ii. Denial of discretion in the imposition of the death penalty 70. The Applicant argues that the mandatory death penalty limits the discretion of judicial officers to consider mitigating evidence. Relying on the Court’s decision in Ally Rajabu v. Tanzania, she submits that this results in the death penalty being imposed mechanically or generically. 71. With regard to her trial, the Applicant submits that the Respondent State should have taken into account her lack of intent to kill the victim, but that to substantiate her intention to kill, the trial judge adopted the characterisation put forth by the prosecution of her as a “cruel woman”. The Applicant also alleges that she has experienced severe hardships including child abuse, female genital mutilation, attempted forced marriage at the age of twelve (12) years, domestic physical violence meted by her first husband, rape by superior police officer while serving in the police force, living with HIV, and the death of her second husband in her second year of imprisonment. 72. It is also the Applicant’s submission that the High Court overlooked her demonstrable capacity for rehabilitation and reform in view of the fact that she did not have a prior criminal record and the twelve (12) years she served as a police officer and her charitable pursuits. She also points to the fact that she is now sixty (60) years old, which means that she has already served her life-time imprisonment and should be released. * 73. In response, the Respondent State reiterates its submission about the lawfulness of the death penalty in its territory. It also points out that “the Applicant’s allegation as to the good character is a mere afterthought since she, with malice aforethought murdered the deceased. And that is not definitely an attribute of a person with good character.” *** 21