the Applicant’s application for review of the Court of Appeal’s decision was dismissed on 19 March 2015. In this regard, the Court further recalls that an Applicant should not be penalised for choosing to pursue the review of the decision of the highest appellate court in a country.16 47. Given that the Court has leeway under Rule 50(2)(f), to set the date from which the computation of reasonable time for filing an Application must be determined, the Court considers that reasonableness of time, in the instant case, should, be computed from the date of the decision of the Court of Appeal on the Applicant’s application for review which is 19 March 2015. Given that the Application was filed on 24 April 2019, the time at stake is four (4) years, one (1) month and five (5) days. It is this period that the Court must assess in determining whether or not the Application was filed within a reasonable time as required by Article 56(6) of the Charter. 48. In the present Application, the Court notes that the Applicant is not only incarcerated but has been on death row since her conviction. The Court takes special cognisance of the fact that she attempted to avail herself of the review procedure after the Court of Appeal dismissed her appeal. Given that the Applicant was entitled to wait for the outcome of the review process, the Court cannot penalise her for having recourse to this remedy. In the circumstances, the Court finds that the period of four (4) years, one (1) month and five (5) days is reasonable within the meaning of Article 56(6) of the Charter.17 49. The Court thus dismisses the Respondent State’s objection alleging that the Application was not filed within a reasonable time. Nguza Viking and another v. Tanzania (merits), § 58. Nguza Viking and another v. Tanzania (merits), §§ 60-61; Armand Guehi v. Tanzania (merits and reparations), § 56. 16 17 15