at the time it was committed. Punishment is personal and can be
imposed only on the offender.
90. The Court notes that while Article 7(2) of the Charter does not make an
explicit provision on the retrospective application of lenient penalties, the
ICCPR to which the Respondent State is a party does. Article 15(1) of the
ICCPR provides for the retrospective application of lenient penalties hence
the determination of this allegation will be made in light of Article 15(1) of
the ICCPR.
91. The issue for determination in the instant case is whether the sentencing of
the Second Applicant to life imprisonment for the offence of gang rape was
an unlawful sentence given that he was 16 years of age at the time of the
commission of the offence and that subsequent to the commission of the
offence and before the Court of Appeal upheld the sentence, the
Respondent State’s Penal Code was amended to provide for a lighter
penalty for offenders below 18 years and convicted of gang rape.
92. The Court notes that Section 131A(2) of the Respondent State’s Penal
Code provided for life imprisonment in cases of gang rape; while the newly
enacted Section 131A(3) of the same Code substitutes the sentence of life
imprisonment with that of corporal punishment, namely strokes of the cane,
for offenders under 18 years at the time of commission of the offence.
Further, Section 73 of the Interpretation of Laws Act of the Respondent
State provides that the above-mentioned substitution of sentence shall not
apply to offenders retrospectively.34
93. It emerges from the record that the Second Applicant was indeed aged 16
years when the offence was committed; and he was convicted for rape and
sentenced to 30 years imprisonment by the District Court on 30 November
2000. However, the Second Applicant’s contention is in respect of his
Section 73, Interpretation of Laws Act [Cap.1 R.E. 2002], “Where an act constitutes an offence and
the penalty for such offence is amended between the time of the commission of such offence and
conviction thereof, the offender shall unless the contrary intention appears be liable to the penalty
prescribed at the time of commission of such offence.”
34
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